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In environments with expected utility, it has long
been established that speculative trade cannot occur
and that the value of public information is negative in
economies with risk‐sharing and no aggregate un-
certainty. We show that these results are still true
even if we relax expected utility, so that either Dy-
namic Consistency (DC) or Consequentialism is vio-
lated. We characterize no speculative trade in terms
of a weakening of DC and find that Consequentialism
is not required. Moreover, we show that a weakening
of both DC and Consequentialism is sufficient for the
value of public information to be negative. We
therefore generalize these important results for con-
vex preferences which contain several classes of
ambiguity averse preferences.
1 | INTRODUCTION
In markets with subjective expected utility (SEU), it has long been established by Milgrom and
Stokey (1982) that speculative trade cannot occur. This means that if the market is at an ex ante
Pareto optimal allocation, differential information among traders in the interim stage can never
imply that it is common knowledge that there is another allocation which Pareto dominates it.
Moreover, in standard neoclassical economies with complete markets and symmetric information,
it is shown with an example by Hirshleifer (1971) and more generally by Schlee (2001) that public
information makes everyone weakly worse off, as it destroys opportunities for mutual insurance.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
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By adopting the SEU model, both these results implicitly assume the following two prop-
erties. The first is Dynamic Consistency (DC), which requires that an action plan is optimal
when evaluated with the updated preferences of a later period, if and only if it is optimal when
evaluated with the preferences of an earlier period. DC ensures that an ex ante optimal action
plan will remain optimal at every period and irrespective of how information is updated. In the
SEU model, DC is expressed through the Bayesian updating of the prior. The second property,
Consequentialism, requires that conditional preferences do not depend on past actions, foregone
payoffs or unrealized events. However, for preferences that are not SEU, at least one of the two
properties must be relaxed (Siniscalchi, 2009).
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether no speculative trade and the negative value
of public information for mutual insurance are still valid in general models with convex pre-
ferences, where either DC or Consequentialism is violated. We find that Consequentialism can
be weakened significantly, whereas DC less so, confirming Machina (1989), who argued that
DC is more natural to retain for non‐SEU preferences.
We first show that Consequentialism can be dropped completely and that the “if ” part of weak
DC, as formulated and motivated in Galanis (2020), is the minimum requirement which ensures
that there is no speculative trade. This means that, if every trader's preferences satisfy this axiom,
there can be no speculative trade, whereas if at least one trader's preferences violate it, there are
examples with speculative trade. Galanis (2020) showed that the “if” part of weak DC characterizes
the Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs, which are identified by Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki
(2008) in the context of convex preferences and can be interpreted as the prices for Arrow‐Debreu
securities which characterize Pareto efficient allocations. Hence, an intuitive axiom for single‐agent
environments has natural implications for a multiagent environment.
Second, we find that, if Consequentialism is weakened to Status Quo Bias, the “only if” part of
DC implies that the value of public information is negative for mutual insurance, so traders would
prefer not to receive free information. We distinguish between two definitions of receiving
more information and find that the stronger is satisfied for preferences that are smooth, so that
subjective beliefs are unique (e.g., the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, &
Mukerji, 2005).
Status Quo Bias has been proposed in axiomatic work by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Sagi
(2006) and Ortoleva (2010), and identified experimentally by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988).
Moreover, the “only if” part of weak DC implies that the value of public information is weakly
negative, so that the traders would prefer to mix more with less information, instead of getting
less information for sure. These results mirror the findings of Galanis (2020) for single‐agent
environments: the “only if” part of DC characterizes an agent who always prefers receiving
more to less information, whereas the “only if” part of weak DC characterizes an agent who
prefers to mix more with less information, instead of getting less information for sure. In other
words, if information is (weakly) valuable for each agent, then public information is (weakly)
not valuable for all agents.
1.1 | Related literature
Rigotti et al. (RSS; 2008) identify the subjective beliefs generated by a large number of models of
ambiguity aversion, based on an idea of Yaari (1969), making our approach very general. We are
not aware of any papers that examine the value of public information in settings that go beyond
SEU preferences. Instead, our model allows a wide variety of ambiguity averse preferences.
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Examples are the convex Choquet model of Schmeidler (1989), the multiple priors model of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the variational preferences model of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini (2006), the multiplier model of Hansen and Sargent (2001), the smooth second‐order
prior models of Klibanoff et al. (2005) and Nau (2006), the confidence preferences model of
Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) and the second‐order expected utility model of Ergin and Gul
(2009).1
Ma (2001) proves that there is no speculative trade, using DC and piecewise monotonicity,
whereas Galanis (2018) examines speculative trade under unawareness, where DC may be
violated, but Consequentialism is not. Halevy (2004) shows that Consequentialism can be
weakened, using Resolute Conditional preferences and Conditional Decomposition, but retains
the full force of DC. In this paper, we prove the same result by weakening both DC and
Consequentialism. Dominiak, Duersch, and Lefort (2012) show experimentally that subjects
violate DC.
Following Kajii and Ui (2009), Martins‐da‐Rocha (2010) also shows that Bayesian updating of
subjective beliefs precludes speculative trade, therefore his result applies to the same preferences as
the current model. Martins‐da‐Rocha (2010) does not discuss Consequentialism, whereas we show
that it is not needed. Moreover, we identify a particular axiom on preferences that is necessary and
sufficient for no speculative trade, Weak Forward Consistency, instead of focusing on the Bayesian
updating of subjective beliefs, which is a condition on utility functions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, we show that
the “if ” part of weak DC is the minimum requirement that precludes speculative trade. In
Section 4, we show that if each agent individually considers information to be (weakly) valuable,
then public information is not (weakly) valuable in competitive risk‐sharing environments with no
aggregate uncertainty. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 | MODEL
2.1 | Preliminaries
Fix a finite set of payoff relevant states S, with typical element s. The set of consequences is + ,
interpreted as monetary payoffs. Let = S+ be the set of acts, with the natural topology. An act
f ∈ maps each state s to a monetary payoff. Given x +∈ , let x ∈ be the constant act with
payoff x at each state s. Let X be the set of constant acts. An act f is strictly positive if f s( ) > 0
for all s S∈ . Let + be the set of strictly positive acts.
For any two acts f g, ∈ and event E S⊆ , we denote by f Eg the act h such that
h s f s( ) = ( ) if s E∈ and h s g s( ) = ( ) if s E∉ . Define f gE≥ if f s g s( ) ( )≥ for all s E∈ , with
strict inequality for some s E∈ . Equality f g=E and strict inequality are similarly defined. Let
Ec be the complement of E with respect to S.
Given events E F S, ⊆ and probability measure p EΔ∈ , where F E⊆ and p F( ) > 0, denote
by p FΔF ∈ the measure obtained through Bayesian conditioning of p on F . Formally, for any





∩ . We write f p s f s( ) ( )p s E ≔ ∑ ∈ for the expectation of f given p.
1Note that RSS adopts a domain of preferences over monetary acts, whereas these models allow for more general
domains. Galanis (2020) discusses their differences.
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Let  be a collection of nonempty events E S⊆ which contains S. A partition Π of S is a
collection of mutually disjoint events, whose union is S. It is finer than another partition Π′ if,
for each E′ Π′∈ , there exists E Π∈ with E E′⊆ . We then say that Π′ is coarser than Π.
2.2 | Updating
We consider two periods. In period 0, no information is revealed and the agent's ex ante
preference relation is denoted by ≿. In period 1, the agent learns that an event E ∈ has
occurred and updates his preferences. Updating is not standard because it depends not only on
the event E, but also on the act f that was chosen in period 0.
Formally, the decision maker is endowed with a collection of conditional preference rela-
tions, { }E h E h, , ≿ ∈ ∈ , one for each event E ∈ and each act h ∈ . The interpretation is that in
period 0 the agent had chosen act h and in period 1 he learns that event E has occurred. His
updated preference relation is then E h,≿ . The ex ante preference relation S h,≿ does not depend
on the act h and is denoted by ≿.
To provide an example, let E be the event that a major economic shock occurs (e.g., because
of COVID‐19), whereas the complement Ec describes business as usual. The agent has a choice
of three acts f g, , and h, where f denotes betting on Delta Airlines shares, g denotes betting on
Apple shares and h denotes betting on Amazon shares.





where π is his prior. In period 0, the agent chooses f , which is the act of betting on Delta Airlines. In
period 1, he is informed that event E has occurred, so he knows there is a COVID‐19 pandemic. His








, so it is independent of the act that was chosen in the
previous period. That is, irrespective of whether he had chosen f , g, or h in period 0, his valuation of
act g (betting on Apple shares) would be exactly the same in period 1, given event E. These are the
standard Consequentialist preferences, that do not depend on what was chosen in the previous period.
To model non‐consequentialist preferences, we allow the updating of preferences to depend
not only on the event, but also on the act that was chosen in the previous period. For instance,
we could specify that in period 1, the agent's utility from act f is u f s( ( ))
s E
π s






0 he chose f , whereas it is u f s( ( ))
s E
π s





, if in period 0 he chose h, allowing for
u uE f E h, ,≠ . If the agent chose act f (Delta Airlines) in period 0 and E occurs, he may feel
disappointed in period 1, so he may become more risk averse. This could be modeled by uE f,
being a concave function of uE h, . In Section 2.5, we provide formal definitions for Con-
sequentialism and the weaker property, Status Quo Bias.
2.3 | Revealed preference
Given preference relation E h,≿ , we say that act f is revealed preferred to act g, written f g*E h,≿ , if
f ag a f+ (1 − )E h,≿ for all a [0, 1]∈ , so that f is weakly preferred to all convex combinations
of f and g. Preference relation *E h,≿ is neither transitive nor complete.
2
The interpretation of f g*E h,≿ is that f is weakly preferred to g under E h,≿ and g is inside a
“budget set,” which is constructed given f as the agent's endowment and some prices for the
2The revealed preference relation is discussed extensively in Galanis (2020).
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Arrow‐Debreu securities, one for each state. If these prices were to prevail and the agent chose
f , it would be revealed that the agent prefers f over g.
2.4 | Convex preferences
We consider the following axioms on preferences { }E h E h, , ≿ ∈ ∈ , for all events E ∈ and
acts h ∈ .
Axiom 1 (Preference). E h,≿ is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For all f ∈ , the sets g g f{ : }E h,∈ ≿ and g f g{ : }E h,∈ ≿ are
closed.
Axiom 3 (Strong Monotonicity). For all f gE≠ , if f gE≥ , then f gE h,≻ .
Axiom 4 (Convexity). For all f ∈ , the set g g f{ }E h,∈ ∣ ≿ is convex.
These axioms are standard and imply that each E h,≿ is represented by a continuous, in-
creasing and quasiconcave function U :E h,  → . We say that preferences { }E E h, ≿ ∈ ∈ are
convex if they satisfy Axioms 1 through 4 and strictly convex if they additionally satisfy
Axiom 5.
Axiom 5 (Strict Convexity). For all f gE≠ and α (0, 1)∈ , if f gE h,≿ , then
αf α g g+ (1 − ) E h,≻ .
Axioms 2 and 3 imply the following property, specifying that if two acts are equal on E, then,
conditional on E, they are indifferent.3
Property 1 (Conditional Preference). For all f g, ∈ , if f g=E then f g~ E h, .
2.5 | Consequentialism
Consequentialism requires that the agent's preferences depend only on the received informa-
tion and not on the act that was chosen in the previous period.4
Axiom 6 (Consequentialism). For all f g, ∈ and events E ∈ , =E f E g, ,≿ ≿ .
A weakening of Axiom 6 has been proposed in axiomatic work by Masatlioglu and Ok
(2005), Sagi (2006), and Ortoleva (2010), where preference relation E h,≿ depends on a “status
quo” act (or frame) h. It specifies that if the agent ever prefers f over g (given some status quo h),
3I thank a referee for pointing out the connection. To see why it is true, suppose that f g=E but f gE h,≻ . Let g′ such
that g s g s′( ) = ( ) + ϵ, ϵ > 0, if s E∈ and g s g s′( ) = ( ) otherwise. From Axiom 3 we have g f′ E h,≻ . Taking ϵ to 0 and
using Axiom 2, we have g fE h,≿ , a contradiction.
4Some papers refer to Consequentialism as the conjunction of Property 1 and Axiom 6.
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then he would also prefer it if the status quo was f . In other words, the status quo exerts attraction
towards itself.
Axiom 7 (Status Quo Bias). For all f g h, , ∈ and events E ∈ , if f gE h,≿
then f gE f,≿ .
Consider again the example of Section 2.2, with the same three acts: f is betting on Delta
Airlines, g is betting on Apple and h is betting on Amazon. Event E describes that there is a
COVID‐19 pandemic, whereas Ec describes business as usual.
Suppose that in period 0 the agent chose h, betting on Amazon. In period 1, event E occurs
and the agent prefers betting on Delta Airlines over Apple ( f gE h,≿ ). Status Quo Bias implies
that f gE f,≿ , so that if he had chosen f in period 0, betting on Delta Airlines, then he would
still prefer f over g in period 1. The intuition is that the agent has a bias towards the status quo
act that he chose in the previous period. However, Status Quo Bias allows g fE g,≻ , so that if the
agent had chosen Apple in period 0, he would still prefer it over Delta Airlines in period 1. This
reversal of preferences ( f gE f,≿ and g fE g,≻ ) violates Consequentialism, because it requires
that preferences conditional on any event E should be the same.
Note that SEU preferences satisfy Status Quo Bias because they also satisfy Con-
sequentialism, which is a stronger property. Status Quo Bias requires that if f is preferred to g
given some status quo act h, then f is also preferred to g given the status quo act f . Con-
sequentialism further requires that f is preferred to g given any status quo act k, because
=E k E h, ,≿ ≿ for all acts k h, .
As pointed by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Status Quo Bias is documented not only by
experimental studies but also by empirical work in actual markets. For instance, Madrian and
Shea (2001) examined how the default choice influenced participation in 401(k) saving plans,
whereas Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) identified Status Quo Bias experimentally, in a
study concerning portfolio choices.
2.6 | Dynamic Consistency
DC provides restrictions on how two acts, which are identical outside of the conditioning event
E, should be compared before and after E is known to have occurred. We break DC into two
Axioms, Forward and Backward Consistency.5
Axiom 8 (Forward Consistency). For all acts f g, ∈ and events E ∈ , if f g≿ and
f g=Ec then f gE f,≿ .
Axiom 9 (Backward Consistency). For all acts f g, ∈ and events E ∈ , if f gE f,≿ and
f g=Ec then f g≿ .
Suppose that f and g specify the same payoff at each state not belonging to event E and that
f is weakly preferred to g ex ante. Forward Consistency says that if the agent has chosen f ex
5I thank the Associate Editor for suggesting these names. Ghirardato (2002) refers to these Axioms as Consistency of
Implementation and Information is Valuable, respectively.
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ante and he is informed that event E has occurred (so that his preferences are E f,≿ ), then in the
interim stage f is still weakly preferred to g. Backward Consistency specifies the converse.
In a single‐agent setting, Galanis (2020) provides an extensive discussion of DC and moti-
vates the following version of weak DC, using the revealed preference relation, *≿ .
Axiom 10 (Weak Forward Consistency). For all acts f +∈ , g ∈ and events E ∈ , if
f g*≿ and f g=Ec then f gE f,≿ .
Axiom 11 (Weak Backward Consistency). For all acts f ∈ , g +∈ and events E ∈ , if
f gE f,≿ , f g=Ec and g f≻ then g f̸ *≿ .
Weak Forward Consistency requires that if f is revealed preferred to g ex ante, then f is
weakly preferred to g, conditional on E.6 Weak Backward Consistency specifies that if f is
weakly preferred to g conditional on E and f but ex ante strictly preferred to f , then g is not
revealed preferred to f ex ante.
2.7 | Subjective beliefs
RSS define the subjective beliefs at an act f and preference relation E h,≿ to be the set of all
normals (normalized to be probabilities) of the supporting hyperplanes of f ,
π f p S g f g f( ) = { Δ : for all }.E h p p E h, , ∈ ≥ ≿
RSS provide two alternative definitions for subjective beliefs and show that all three coincide
for strictly positive acts. First, suppose that the agent's endowment is act f and we interpret a
probability measure as a set of prices, one for each Arrow‐Debreu security which pays 1 in a
particular state and 0 otherwise. Given preference relation E h,≿ , the subjective beliefs revealed
by unwillingness to trade at f contain the measures (prices) for which the agent would be
unwilling to trade his endowment,
π f p S f g g g f( ) = { Δ : for all such that = }.E h
u
E h p p, ,  ∈ ≿
Second, let P be a set of measures (prices) such that whenever another act k is unaffordable
for every p P∈ , then there exists a mixture of k with endowment f that the agent would strictly
prefer to his endowment. The smallest such P of measures contains the subjective beliefs re-
vealed by willingness to trade at f . Formally, let f( )E h, denote the collection of all compact,
convex sets P SΔ⊆ such that if g f>p p  for all p P∈ , then g f fϵ + (1 − ϵ) E h,≻ for suffi-
ciently small ϵ > 0. Then, the subjective beliefs revealed by willingness to trade at f are denoted
by π f f( ) = ( )E h
w




, , , .
It is important to emphasize that the subjective beliefs are not the beliefs that are used in the
utility representation of preferences, such as SEU or Maxmin Expected Utility (Gilboa &
Schmeidler, 1989). First, they vary as the act f on which they are evaluated changes, even if
we assume Consequentialism. Second, they are only defined for convex preferences, although
6We also require that f is a strictly positive act.
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there are some extensions to nonconvex preferences (Ghirardato & Siniscalchi, 2018). Since
they are the normals of the supporting hyperplane at an allocation, this allocation is Pareto
optimal if and only there is a common subjective belief. Galanis (2020) shows that their
Bayesian updating is equivalent to Weak Forward Consistency. We employ this result in the
current paper and use subjective beliefs to construct full insurance allocations.
3 | SPECULATIVE TRADE
In this and the next section, we show that weak DC has economic content in multiagent
settings, such as financial markets. First, we show that Axiom 10 is the minimum requirement
which precludes speculative trade. In a single‐agent setting, Galanis (2020) shows that Axiom 10
is equivalent to Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs.
Consider an economy consisting of I agents, with I m| | = and typical element i. Each
agent's consumption set is the set of acts  . He is endowed with a collection of convex pre-
ferences { }E h
i
E h, , ≿ ∈ ∈ .
An economy is a tuple e{ } , , {Π }E h
i
i I E h
i
i I, , , 〈 ≿ 〉∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ , where e
S
++∈ is the aggregate en-
dowment and {Π }i i I∈ denotes the information structure, where eachΠi ⊆ is a partition of S. If
in period 0 the resulting allocation is f , then in period 1 and at state s, agent i considers states in
sΠ ( )i to be possible and has conditional preferences
s f
i
Π ( ),i i
≿ .




∑ . It is interior if
f s( ) > 0i for all s S∈ and for all i. Given an event E S⊆ , let K E s S s E( ) = { : Π ( ) }i i∈ ⊆ be the
set of states where i knows E . Event E is self evident if E K E( )i⊆ for all i I∈ . That is, an event
is self evident if whenever it happens, everyone knows it. An event F is common knowledge at s
if and only if there exists a self evident event E such that s E F∈ ⊆ (Aumann, 1976).
We say that there is speculative trade if an allocation is ex ante Pareto efficient (according to
preferences { }i i I≿ ∈ ) but at some state s S∈ it is common knowledge that there exists a Pareto
improvement.
Definition 1. There is speculative trade in economy e{ } , , {Π }E h
i
i I E h
i
i I, , , 〈 ≿ 〉∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ at an ex
ante Pareto efficient allocation f if there is agent j I∈ , state s′ and feasible allocation g such





Π ( ), Π ( ),i i j j
∈ ≿ ∈ ≻ is common knowledge
at s′.
We now show that Axiom 10 is necessary and sufficient for preventing speculative trade. In
particular, if all agents' preferences satisfy Axiom 10 then there is no speculative trade, whereas
if at least one fails it, there are economies with speculative trade. Let  be the collection of
convex preferences { }E h E h, , ≿ ∈ ∈ . Note that we do not require Consequentialism or Status
Quo Bias.
Proposition 1. If { }E h
i
i I E h
I
, , ,  ≿ ∈∈ ∈ ∈ satisfy Axiom 10 then there is no speculative trade
in any economy e{ } , , {Π }E h
i
i I E h
i
i I, , , 〈 ≿ 〉∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ and at any interior allocation f . Conversely, if
{ }E h
k
E h, ,  ≿ ∈∈ ∈ fails Axiom 10 then there exist preferences { }E hi i I E h I, , ,  ≿ ∈∈ ∈ ∈ satisfying
Axiom 10 and economy e{ } , , {Π }E h
i
i I k E h
i
i I k, { }, , { } 〈 ≿ 〉∈ ∪ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∪ such that there is speculative
trade at an allocation f .
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To provide a sketch of the proof for one direction, suppose by contradiction that allocation
f{ }i i I∈ is ex ante Pareto efficient but in the interim it is common knowledge at some state s′ that
allocation g{ }i i I∈ is a Pareto improvement. From Aumann (1976), there exists a self evident
event F containing s′, where s F∈ implies g fi s f iΠ ( ),i i≻ for all i I∈ .
7 Property 1 implies
g s f fΠ ( )i i i s f iΠ ( ),i i≻ . Because each Πi partitions F , Axiom 10 implies g Ff f( ) >p i i p i  for all
p π f( )i i∈ . By convexity of preferences, g Ff f fϵ + (1 − ϵ)i i i i i≻ for small enough ϵ > 0, which
contradicts that f{ }i i I∈ is ex ante Pareto efficient. Proposition 1 is also true if we replace Axiom 3
(Strong Monotonicity) with Monotonicity, Property 1 and Axiom 8 (Weak Full Support) in
Galanis (2020).
Proposition 1 cannot be proven just by assuming Dynamic Consistency. Ma (2001) and Halevy
(2004), whose setting is in terms of abstract preferences and drop Consequentialism, require an
“additivity” property, that replaces Consequentialism. For example, Ma (2001) requires that if
f gE g,i≿ for each i = 1, 2, 3, where E E E, ,1 2 3, form a partition of E, then f gE g,≿ . In the current
setting, this additivity property is true for some acts and only in terms of their expected value, given
a subjective belief. In other words, the property is true only for the revealed preference relation *≿ .
However, this is enough, together with Weak Forward Consistency, to prove the result. Although
the additivity property is not implied by Consequentialism, it is jointly implied by Dynamic
Consistency and Consequentialism, because these two axioms imply SEU preferences, together
with some standard axioms (Ghirardato, 2002).
4 | THE VALUE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
In a single‐agent setting, Galanis (2020) shows that information is (weakly) valuable if and only
if Axiom 9 (Axiom 11) is satisfied.8 In this section, we explore whether public information is
valued in multiagent settings where each agent values information individually. In the standard
environment with SEU preferences, where each agent values information, Hirshleifer (1971)
first argued with an example that if agents trade to mutually insure, then more public in-
formation could make everyone worse off. Schlee (2001) generalized this result, showing that
the value of public information is negative in an expected utility model with a common prior,
risk aversion and no aggregate uncertainty. His comparative statics are with respect to com-
petitive equilibria, whereas Campbell (2004) establishes Hirshleifer's result in the more general
solution concept of implementable allocations.9 We concentrate on competitive equilibria, thus
following Schlee (2001).
For strictly convex preferences, we find that as long as Weak Forward Consistency and
Status Quo Bias are satisfied, if every agent (weakly) values information, then public in-
formation is locally (weakly) not valuable.10 Additionally, if preferences are smooth, so that
subjective beliefs are unique at each act, public information is (weakly) not valuable.
7We can assume strict preference for everyone due to Strong Monotonicity.
8We only examine information in terms of its nonintrinsic value, as it enables an agent to make better contingent plans.
Grant, Kajii, and Polak (1998) study the case where preferences for information are intrinsic. For example, an agent
may feel better (or worse) if he knows whether he has a certain incurable disease.
9These two papers use the Blackwell (1951) criterion of more information. Moreover, Schlee (2001) proves this result in
two other cases, that we do not examine. First, there are some risk neutral agents who fully insure the risk averse ones.
Second, all agents are risk averse and the economy has a representative agent.
10Similar results are shown by Galanis (2015, 2016), in an environment with unawareness, where DC is violated but
Consequentialism is not.
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To rule out pure indifference to betting, we assume strictly convex preferences. We also
assume the following axiom, which is proposed by RSS.
Axiom 12 (Translation Invariance at Certainty). For all acts h ∈ and events E ∈ , for
all g S∈ and all constant bundles x x, ′ > 0, if x λg x+ E h,≿ for some λ > 0, then there
exists λ′ > 0 such that x λ g x′ + ′ ′E h,≿ .
RSS show that Axiom 12 is satisfied by most classes of ambiguity averse preferences





for all constant acts x x, ′ > 0. We henceforth write πE h
i
, instead of π x( )E h
i
, for all constant
acts x > 0.
We also impose a slight variation of Axiom 10. First, we weaken it by applying it only to
constant acts, x . Second, we strengthen it by applying it not only between the ex ante preference
relation *≿ and the interim E x,≿ , but also between *F h,≿ and E x,≿ , where E F⊆ and F ∈ . In other
words, it is as if we consider a multiperiod model where the agent first learns F and then E.
Axiom 13 (Multiperiod Weak Forward Consistency). For all acts x g h, , ∈ , where
x > 0 is constant, and events F E, ∈ with E F⊆ , if x g*F h,≿ and x g=Ec then x gE x,≿ .
There are two periods, 0 and 1. In period 0, the agents have not received any information but
they have a common information structure about period 1, which is represented by partition Π
of S. Hence, there is symmetric information among all agents. The initial allocation is e{ }i i I∈ ,
where ei +∈ .The aggregate endowment is e e=i I
i S
++∑ ∈∈ . We assume that there is no
aggregate uncertainty, so e is constant across all states in S. The economy in period 0 is a
tuple S e, , …, ,m1⟨ ≿ ≿ ⟩.
In period 1, all agents are informed that some event E Π∈ has occurred and trade, using
their conditional preferences. Hence, information is symmetric. Trading at each E Π∈ gen-
erates an act for each agent, which is evaluated in period 0 using preference relation i≿ .
Given event E Π∈ , an allocation for economy E e, , …, ,




,i m⟨ ≿ ≿ ⟩ is a tuple
f f f= ( , …, )E E E






∑ . It is interior if f s( ) > 0E
i for all
s E∈ and for all i. A feasible allocation fE is full insurance if each fE
i is constant across all states















≻ for some j I∈ .
Fix a collection of convex preferences { }E h
i
i I E h, , , ≿ ∈ ∈ ∈ . Let e= {Π, } be an aggregate
decision problem, where Π ⊆ is a partition of S and e S++∈ is the aggregate endowment,
assumed constant across states.
Given event E Π∈ and economy E e, , …, ,




,i m⟨ ≿ ≿ ⟩, define f f= { }E E
i
i I
m∈∈ to be an
equilibrium allocation if it is feasible and there are prices p S+∈ , with p s( ) = 0 if s E∉ , such
that, for each i I∈ , f ep E
i
p
i ≤ and f gEi E hi , i≿ for all g such that g ep p i ≤ .
We say that interior allocation f{ }i i I∈ is admissible for aggregate decision problem
e= {Π, } if, for each agent i I∈ , for each E Π∈ , f f=i E E
i , where f f= { }E E
i
i I∈ is an equi-
librium allocation of economy E e, , …, ,






m1⟨ ≿ ≿ ⟩. In words, f{ }i i I∈ is admissible if, under
11Note that we define the aggregate endowment of the economy as a map from S (rather than E) to ++ . This is without
loss of generality because, from Property 1, what the endowment prescribes outside of E is irrelevant. For consistency,
we do the same for all subsequent acts.
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some equilibrium, agent i receives fE
i at each E Π∈ . Note that for admissibility we require that




i≿ is the allocation that is actually chosen, fE
i .
We compare aggregate decision problems by evaluating the admissible acts they generate.
Definition 2. Aggregate decision problem e= {Π , }2 2 is locally more valuable than
e= {Π , }1 1 if whenever g{ }i i I∈ is admissible for 2 , there exists f{ }i i I∈ which is admissible
for 1 and g fi i i≿ , for all i I∈ . It is locally weakly more valuable if ag a f f+ (1 − )i i i≿ for
some a (0, 1]∈ .
Aggregate decision problem 2 is locally more valuable than 1 if for every allocation
which is admissible for 2 , there is an admissible allocation 1 , such that every agent ex
ante prefers the former over the latter. It is locally weakly more valuable if each agent
prefers a convex combination of the two. The “local” indicates that it is possible that there
is an admissible allocation for 1 , such that no admissible allocation for 2 is ex ante
weakly preferred by all agents. We eliminate this case with the following, stronger
definition.
Definition 3. Aggregate decision problem e= {Π , }2 2 is more valuable than
e= {Π , }1 1 if whenever f{ }i i I∈ is admissible for 1 , there exists g{ }i i I∈ which is
admissible for 2 and g fi i i≿ , for all i I∈ . It is weakly more valuable if
ag a f f+ (1 − )i i i≿ for some a (0, 1]∈ .
If 1 differs from 2 only because partition Π1 is finer than Π2, we can examine whether
more information has any value for the agents, by comparing how they evaluate the admissible
allocations ex ante. We say that public information is locally (weakly) not valuable if an
aggregate decision problem with a coarser partition is always locally (weakly) more valuable
than a decision problem with a finer partition, ceteris paribus.
Definition 4. Public information is locally (weakly) not valuable for { }E h
i
i I E h, , , ≿ ∈ ∈ ∈
if, for all endowments e and partitions Π , Π1 2 of S, Π1 finer than Π2, aggregate decision
problem e= {Π , }2 2 is locally (weakly) more valuable as e= {Π , }1 1 .
If we drop the term “locally,” we have that public information is (weakly) not valuable if an
aggregate decision problem with a coarser partition is always (weakly) more valuable than a
decision problem with a finer partition, ceteris paribus.
Definition 5. Public information is (weakly) not valuable for { }E h
i
i I E h, , , ≿ ∈ ∈ ∈ if, for all
endowments e and partitions Π , Π1 2 of S, Π1 finer than Π2, aggregate decision problem
e= {Π , }2 2 is (weakly) more valuable than e= {Π , }1 1 .
The following Proposition shows that if information is (weakly) valuable for each agent,
then public information is locally (weakly) not valuable. To show the stronger result that
information is (weakly) not valuable, we need to assume that preferences are smooth at cer-
tainty, so that subjective beliefs are unique at constant acts. Formally, for all constant acts x , all
agents i I∈ and events E ∈ , π x( )E
i is a singleton. Examples of smooth preferences at certainty
are SEU, smooth ambiguity (Klibanoff, Marinacci, & Mukerji, 2009) and smooth variational
preferences (Maccheroni et al., 2006). For example, Hanany and Klibanoff (2009) propose the
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smooth updating rule, which Galanis (2020) shows that it satisfies Weak Forward Consistency.
Moreover, we need to assume Status Quo Bias.
Proposition 2. Suppose strictly convex preferences { }E h
i
i I E h, , , ≿ ∈ ∈ ∈ satisfy Axioms 7, 12,
and 13. Then, Axiom 9 (Axiom 11) implies that public information is locally (weakly) not
valuable. If, additionally, preferences are smooth at certainty, then public information is
(weakly) not valuable.
Proposition 2 requires Axiom 3 (Strong Monotonicity), to ensure that the equilibrium al-
locations are interior, because all states are nonnull. Strong Monotonicity is important in
determining whether representing information through partitional structures is without loss of
generality. In particular, the no speculative trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and
the value of public information theorem of Schlee (2001) use a signal structure, where there is a
set S of payoff relevant states and a set Z of signals. The full state space is S ZΩ = × . Each
signal structure with nonnull states generates an equivalent partitional structure, with the same
state space Ω, where a partition element is defined as s z s z z zΠ({ , }) = {{ , } Ω : = }k k l l l k∈ .
However, a signal structure with some null states will generate a partitional structure with
some null states, so Strong Monotonicity is violated. This implies that we cannot apply Pro-
position 2 to a signal structure where some states are null. However, as explained in Section 3,
Proposition 1 is true even without Strong Monotonicity.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix j I∈ . From Axioms 2 and 3 we have that
H G s S g f i I= { : for all }i
s f
i i
0 Π ( ),i i
≡ ∈ ≻ ∈ for some feasible allocation g0, as we can
always distribute a small enough portion of j's allocation to everyone else. We
subsequently show that G cannot be common knowledge at any s, denoting g0 by g.
Because f is an ex ante efficient allocation, there does not exist a feasible allocation h
such that h fi i i≻ for all i I∈ . Suppose that there exists feasible allocation g such thatG is
common knowledge at s S∈ . Let F be a self evident event such that s F G∈ ⊆ . Note that
each Πi partitions F . Then, we have that for each i I∈ , for each s F′ ∈ , g fi
s f
i i
Π ( ′),i i
≻ .
From Property 1, g s f fΠ ( ′)i i i
s f
i i
Π ( ′),i i
≻ . Using Axiom 10 we have that f g s f̸ Π ( ′)*i i i i i≿ .
Noting that f i is strictly positive, so that π π=ui i, and from the definition of πui, we have
that g s f f( Π ( ′) ) >p i i i p i  for all p π f( )i i∈ . Because this is true for all s S′ ∈ such that
s FΠ ( ′)i ⊆ and Πi partitions F , we have that g Ff f( ) >p i i p i  , for all p π f( )i i∈ . Define
h g Ff=i i i and h h= { }i i I∈ .
Allocation f is interior, hence π f π f π f( ) = ( ) = ( )ui i wi i i i . Because h f>p i p i  for all
p π f( )wi i∈ , we have that for small enough ϵi, h f fϵ + (1 − ϵ )i i i i i i≻ . By taking ϵ < ϵi for
all i I∈ , we have that h f fϵ + (1 − ϵ)i i i i≻ for all i I∈ . Moreover, h fϵ + (1 − ϵ) is feasible
because both f and h are feasible. Hence, f is not ex ante efficient, a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that { }E h E h,
1
, ≿ ∈ ∈ fails Axiom 10. This means that for some
event E ∈ and acts f +∈ , g ∈ , with f g=Ec , we have g fE f,
1≻ and g fp p0 0 ≤ for
some p π f( )u0
1∈ . Consider an economy with two agents, 1 and 2. Their information
structure is identical, so that E EΠ = Π = Π = { , }c1 2 . Let e f g= + . Agent 2 has
preferences represented by expected utility. In particular, h h~ ′2 if and only if
h h= ′p p0 0  . His conditional preferences given E or Ec are given by updating p0
using Bayes' rule. This is well defined because Axiom 3 implies Axiom 8 (Weak Full
Support) in Galanis (2020), hence from Lemma 2 in that paper we have
that p E p E( ), ( ) > 0c .
We next show that allocation h f g= { , } is ex ante Pareto efficient. Suppose there exists
allocation x y{ , } such that x f1≻ and y g2≿ . Because p π f( )u0
1∈ , we have that
x f>p p0 0  . Moreover, y gp p0 0 ≥ . These inequalities imply that p0
x y f g e( + ) > ( + ) =p p0 0  , which implies that x y e+ ≠ , hence x y{ , } is not feasible. A
similar argument applies if x f1≿ and y g2≻ .
Note that f g2≿ because g fp p0 0 ≤ . Given E and since f g=Ec , we have that
g fp pE E0 0 ≤ , which implies f gE g,2≿ . Because g fE1≻ , at each s E∈ it is common
knowledge that allocation h g f′ = { , } Pareto dominates h f g= { , }, hence there is speculative
trade. □
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that because Axiom 5 implies Axiom 7 (No Flat Kinks)
in Galanis (2020), Proposition 1 in that paper implies that if information is (weakly)
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valuable then { }E h
i
i I E h, , , ≿ ∈ ∈ ∈ satisfy Axiom 9 (Axiom 11), for each i I∈ . Let e be the
endowment and suppose partition Π1 is finer than partition Π2. Let g{ }i i I∈ be admissible
for e= {Π , }2 2 , defined as follows. Let g{ }E E Π2 2 2∈ be a tuple where, for each E Π2 2∈ , gE2
is an equilibrium allocation for economy E e, , …, ,









〈 ≿ ≿ 〉 with (normalized)




first welfare theorem, gE2 is Pareto optimal. From Proposition 9 in RSS, gE2 is a full




constant across all states in E2. From Axiom 3, p s( ) > 0E2 for all s E2∈ and






2 , for all s E2∈ and all i I∈ . Hence, gE2 is also an interior allocation.












is the same for all
constant acts, from Axiom 12.







for all strictly positive acts f . We
have already shown in the previous paragraph that p E( ) > 0E 12 for all E E1 2⊆ , because
Axiom 3 implies that p s( ) > 0E2 for all s E2∈ .
12 It is straightforward that we can use the
proof of Proposition 2 in Galanis (2020), but applying Axiom 13 instead of Axiom 10, to
show that there is Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs at a constant act, between any







∈ ⋂ , for each E E1 2⊆ ,
where x is any constant act, E Π1 1∈ and pE
E
1
2 is the Bayesian update of pE2 on E1.
Define allocation f{ }i i I∈ as follows. If E E1 2⊆ , where E Π1 1∈ and E Π2 2∈ , then
f f=i E E
i
1 1
, where f f f= ( , …, )E E E
m1
1 1 1








s E1∈ . Hence, fE1 is a full insurance allocation and we set x f= E
i
1 for the Bayesian updating of


















is weakly preferred to each act h
that is affordable given prices pE
E
1
2. Because fE1 is feasible, it is an equilibrium allocation of
economy E e( , , …, , )









≿ ≿ . By repeating this for all E E,1 2, f{ }i i I∈ is admissible for 1 .




  . Because p πE i E gi , Ei
2
2 2


















≿ , for each E Π2 2∈ and each i I∈ .
Enumerate the partition cells of E EΠ = { , …, }n2 1 . If n = 1 then SΠ = { }2 is the
uninformative partition and g fi i i≿ for each i I∈ , so we are done. Suppose that n 2≥ .
For cell k n1 ≤ ≤ define act hk
i as follows. Let h s g s( ) = ( )k
i i if s Ej∈ , where j k1 ≤ ≤ ,
and h s f s( ) = ( )k
i i otherwise. Note that h g=n
i i and let h f=i i0 . For each k n1 ≤ ≤ , from























−1≿ . By Axiom 1, we have that
12Alternatively, Axiom 3 implies Axiom 8 (Weak Full Support) in Galanis (2020), hence Lemma 2 in that paper
implies p E( ) > 0E 12 .
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g fi i i≿ , for each i I∈ , which implies that 2 is locally more valuable than 1 .
Therefore, Axiom 9 implies that public information is locally not valuable.
We next show that Axiom 11 implies that public information is locally weakly not























≿ . From Axiom 11, either h fE
i i i
2




and f h̸ *i i E
i
2
≿ . If h fE
i i i
2
≿ , Axiom 5 implies that for all a (0, 1)∈ , ah a f f+ (1 − )E
i i i i
2
≻ .





  for all p π f( )i i∈ , or that h f>p Ei p i2  .





  for all p π f( )i i∈ . Repeating this
argument for all E Π2 2∈ , we have that g f>p i p i  for all p π f( )i i∈ . By definition, for
small enough ϵ > 0i , g f fϵ + (1 − ϵ )i i i i i i≻ . By taking ϵ < ϵi for all i I∈ , we have that
g f fϵ + (1 − ϵ)i i i i≻ for all i I∈ , hence public information is locally weakly not valuable.
We now prove that if preferences are smooth at certainty, Axiom 9 (Axiom 11) implies
that public information is (weakly) not valuable. Let p π x{ } = ( )i i be the unique subjective




, be the Bayesian update for
event E ∈ and status quo act x . From Axiom 12 we have π x π x( ) = ( ′)i i for all constant
acts x x, ′. Since subjective beliefs are unique and they are updated using Bayes' rule, we
have that π x π x( ) = ( ′)E
i
E
i for all E ∈ and x x, ′.
We need to show that for any allocation f{ }i i I∈ , admissible for 1 , there is an
allocation g{ }i i I∈ , admissible for 2 , that dominates it ex ante. Suppose that f{ }i i I∈ is
admissible for 1 , defined in a similar way as g{ }i i I∈ for 2 , in the beginning of the proof.
That is, f{ }E E Π1 1 1∈ is a tuple where, for each E Π1 1∈ , fE1 is an equilibrium allocation for
economy E e, , …, ,









⟨ ≿ ≿ ⟩ with (normalized) prices p SΔE1 ∈ , such that p s( ) = 0E1
if s E1∉ . For each E Π1 1∈ , let f f=i E E
i
1 1
. Using the same arguments as in the first
paragraph of this proof, fE1 is an interior, Pareto optimal and full insurance allocation.










for all i I∈ . In other words, the equilibrium price is just
the updated subjective belief given E1, that is therefore common among all agents,







. Similarly, we can define admissible allocation g{ }i i I∈ for 2 and show that it






 and pE2 is equilibrium
price and the common subjective belief, updated given E2. Since Π1 is finer than Π2 and




E E2 2 2
  . The rest of the proof is
exactly the same as the last three paragraphs of the proof that public information is
locally (weakly) not valuable. □
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